

urrent Intelligence Country Hand Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00826A003200190001-0  
Zambia Aug 1966

**SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

**August 1966**

**OCI No. 1884/66**

**Copy No 323**

**Current Intelligence Country Handbook**

**ZAMBIA**



**DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE**

**SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Current Intelligence Country Handbooks are designed to give the reader ready access to the salient facts about a country and its main current problems. They are not intended to provide comprehensive basic intelligence on a country or to speak with the authority of coordinated national intelligence. The information presented is the best available to the Office of Current Intelligence as of the date at the top of the page.

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

August 1966

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

## ZAMBIA

### 1. Political

Zambian politics is an extension of the nationalist movement which won independence from Great Britain in 1964. President Kenneth Kaunda's skill in handling the divisive elements within the movement's political vehicle, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), has resulted in UNIP's continued dominance of the national scene. Kaunda has maintained a consensus among the Zambian leadership largely predicated on an intricate balance of tribal and regional interests and on early massive national development to provide Zambians with the social and economic benefits which they feel should accompany political independence.

Zambia's economic viability has enabled the country to institute a development program which is impressive by African standards and has helped restrict popular dissatisfaction. The principal stumbling block is the lack of an educated or skilled indigenous labor force to staff the government, the economy, or the social services with the requisite manpower. Consequently, Zambia is dependent on a small number (less than two percent of the country's population) of white expatriates, most of whom work in Zambia under short-term contracts.

To retain the whites, Zambia must offer high financial inducements. Many Zambians find racial wage disparities grating and campaign vigorously for their elimination. The government also has had to contend with widespread demands by the mass of unemployed and unskilled semi-literate Africans of the cities and the industrialized Copperbelt region for "Zambianization," or replacement of the whites. In the vanguard of the discontent are Zambia's second echelon and local leadership, often UNIP members, who wish to further their own political careers or who are unable to understand the complexities of compromise which the progress of the entire country entails.

Zambia's dependence on expatriate white personnel for years to come is also a source of strong racial tension. Not only is the presence of white expatriates in virtually all the "best" positions in Zambia blatantly obvious to Africans, but most of the whites, although termed "Europeans," come from white-dominated social structures in pre-independent Zambia, South Africa, and Rhodesia. They maintain strong ties with their southern neighbors.

Rhodesia's declaration of independence has complicated Zambian politics. Pan-African feelings are strong among Zambians, and they

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

August 1966

25X6

[REDACTED] toward their southern neighbor as a result of past political ties, especially the white, Salisbury-dominated Rhodesian Federation (1952-63) which increased Zambia's economic dependence on Rhodesia. However, the fact of Zambia's economic dependence on white southern Africa and on sympathizers of the Smith regime has dictated a relatively moderate Zambian policy on Rhodesia. [REDACTED]

25X6

25X6

Tribal and regional jockeying also strains national unity. However, the significance of localized interests is largely undercut by the presence of many regional leaders in the national superstructure, where they support national policies. Furthermore, none has sufficient political or military power to threaten seriously the present government individually, and they are too introversive to have attempted to form a united position aimed against the central government.

As domestic pressures have obstructed national progress, the central government has tended to extend government or UNIP authority to control them. To date it has avoided militant pressures for a one-party state and other measures which would transform UNIP into the monolithic national arbiter. However, a hesitancy to tighten UNIP discipline has led Zambia's leadership to accept occasional heavy-handed policies in individual cases. For example, it has attempted to supplant the established leaders of a strong labor union with party stalwarts, which has frustrated rather than helped attempts to achieve national cohesion.

To defend against internal disturbances, the government relies on the apolitical police force and its supporting units, the army and air force. They are capable of carrying out their mission and the government is sensitive to their needs. For historical reasons the police has been able to have most of its European personnel replaced with reasonably competent Zambians, and adequate pay, housing, and other material benefits have limited other sources of discontent.

## 2. Economic

The modern sector of Zambia's economy is booming. The monetary gross domestic product for 1964 was \$613.8 million, an increase of 18 percent over 1963, while Zambia's favorable trade balance for 1964 was \$250.7 million. However, the entire modern sector of the economy depends on the copper industry, with mines and smelters concentrated in the Copperbelt, a small area along the Congo border. Zambia's cop-

2 - Zambia

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

August 1966

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

per production—third highest in the world—accounts for over 90 percent of Zambia's export earnings and almost half of the GDP. Thus Zambia is highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world copper market. It is also dependent on continuing relations with white-controlled Rhodesia because most of the electric power and coal required for copper production comes from Rhodesia, and almost all of Zambia's exports and imports have passed over Rhodesian railroads.

The economy is lopsided, however. Only 8 percent of the indigenous population are wage-earners; most Zambians remain in the rural subsistence economy and live under primitive conditions. Furthermore, the African wage-earners earn far less than the white wage-earners. In 1964 the overage of African wages (\$600) was only one-eighth of the average for the 32,000 white wage-earners. The discrepancy is due primarily to differences in skills and education, but expatriates also receive higher wages than Africans holding comparable positions.

Zambia's Transitional Development Plan, running from January 1965 to July 1966, aimed to double the moderate rate of developmental spending (\$2.8 million per month) which had been reached under British administration. Most of the developmental investment (\$98 million) is to be distributed about evenly among four sectors: 1) transport, communications, and power; 2) agriculture and national resources; 3) housing and local government services; and 4) education and technical training. Although the plan was conservative from a fiscal standpoint, being financed mostly from Zambian resources, actual implementation has lagged almost 25 percent below targets, primarily because of the lack of skilled manpower. Current political trends, intensified by the confrontation with the white regime in Rhodesia, are pushing the government toward projects which offer hope of early release from dependence on the white regimes of southern Africa. The vaguely projected "Tanzam rail link," intended to provide a new outlet on the Indian Ocean by connecting the present Zambian and Tanzanian rail systems, has become a particular political "must" for both Kaunda and President Nyerere of Tanzania, although its economic feasibility is uncertain. Other priority projects are road networks through black-ruled Africa, the exploration of rich but undefined coal deposits, and a large hydroelectric scheme.

### 3. International Relations

Zambia's international importance derives from its pivotal position on the frontier between the independent African states and white-ruled southern Africa. President Kaunda, determined to maintain

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Zambia — 3

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

August 1966

substantial economic ties with the white regimes, hopes he can assert a moderating influence among militant African nationalists who seek to liberate southern Africa. He may not in the long run withstand internal and external pressures to permit the use of Zambia as the primary staging area for subversive operations against the white regimes. These pressures include: the anti-colonial tradition of the UNIP, frequently evoked by Kaunda's rivals within the party; the need to go along with the OAU, which assists the freedom fighters through its African Liberation Committee; the refugee nationalists from all the white-ruled territories of Southern Africa, who congregate in Lusaka and mend their own fences among Zambian politicians; and five Communist embassies newly established in Lusaka, where they can cultivate the refugee leaders as well as Kaunda's domestic rivals.

Zambia's primary and most immediate foreign policy problem is Rhodesia's drive to gain full independence from Britain on the basis of white supremacy. Zambia has sought to press Britain for a solution by military force or mandatory economic sanctions under United Nations aegis, but has avoided unilateral measures against Rhodesia that would risk retaliation crippling to Zambia's economy. Concurrently, Zambia is attempting to develop transport routes through independent African countries, which would reduce dependence on Rhodesia and permit greater Zambian freedom of action, perhaps involving support for Rhodesian insurgents.

Kaunda looks to neighboring African states, and particularly to Tanzania, for support. With the goal of disengagement from Rhodesian ties in mind, Zambia has expanded the primary attention of its foreign policies towards black Africa from East Africa to include the Congo (Kinshasa) and Malawi. Improved relations with these two countries has been abetted by their own desires to improve pan-African images.

Zambian relations with Portugal and South Africa are correct but diplomatic representatives are not exchanged. Zambia's policy toward the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola and South Africa have the same ultimate objective of disengagement as its Rhodesian policy. However, for several years many of Zambia's trade needs and substitutes for Rhodesian goods and services must be found in the other white-ruled African entities, particularly Mozambique's and Angola's transport facilities.

On the world scene, Zambia wishes to avoid involvement in international crosscurrents that do not directly affect Zambia. It follows a policy of non-alignment and strong support for the United Nations and other international bodies to settle disputes. Relations are main-

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

August 1966

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

tained with Communist countries—the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland—but, principally because of a wariness of Communist intentions, diplomatic activity in Zambia is under strict control. Zambia looks to moderate foreign countries to supply vitally needed skilled manpower, preferring the less-powerful states in the Commonwealth and Europe. For large needs, Zambia turns to the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent the US.

#### 4. Subversion

The known opposition movements in Zambia are so localized and ineffective that they are unlikely to overthrow the present constitutional government. The most serious challenge is posed by various elements within the cabinet, the UNIP, and the labor movement who seek to subvert Kaunda's constructive policies by inflaming the anti-white and anti-colonial sentiments among the Zambian people and by stirring up popular dissatisfaction with the rate of material and social progress since independence. Although no Zambian openly espouses Communism, at least 150 have received academic or technical training in Communist countries since 1960. The five Communist embassies in Lusaka are making circumspect but persistent efforts to cultivate the Zambian elite as well as the refugee nationalists from the white-ruled territories of southern Africa.

The Zambian Government has issued tight regulations on the conduct of foreign diplomats and representatives of foreign refugee organizations, restricting them to Lusaka and generally curtailing their political activities.

Internal security problems are also posed by tribal and other primitive movements, which continuously impede modernization through passive resistance and occasional violence. The Lumpa Church, comprising a volatile mixture of Christianity and indigenous animism, provoked a wave of terrorism in the Northern and Eastern Provinces during the summer of 1964 which took over 700 lives. Prophetess Alice Lenshina and other leaders remain under indefinite detention. Local obstructionism by the African National Congress in the Southern Province is goading the authorities toward repressive measures which might transform an ineffective legal party into a spearhead for a Tonga tribal uprising.

#### Chronology of Key Events

1889 British South Africa Company (BSAC) granted a royal charter "to promote trade, commerce, civilization, and good government."

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Zambia — 5



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

August 1966

- 1924 British Government assumes full administrative responsibility for the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, with BSAC retaining mineral rights obtained through previous treaties with indigenous rulers.
- 1953 Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia included in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
- 1960 Formation of the presently dominant United National Independence Party (UNIP) with Kenneth Kaunda as party president.
- 1962 Elections under a transitional constitution results in the first African majorities in both Legislative and Executive Councils.
- 1963 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland dissolved.
- 1964 (January) First general election under a constitution granting universal adult suffrage and full internal self-government results in a large legislative majority for UNIP; Kenneth Kaunda becomes first Prime Minister.  
(October) Republic of Zambia becomes a fully independent member of the Commonwealth; Kaunda is inaugurated President following an unopposed election.

#### Selected Factual Data

##### LAND (U)

288,000 sq. mi.; (of which less than 5% under cultivation), 10% grazing, 13% dense forest, 6% marsh, 61% scattered trees and grassland

##### PEOPLE (U)

Population: 3.8 million; males 15-49, 888,000; 450,000 fit for military service

Ethnic Divisions: 97.9% African, 1.9% European, .2% other

Religion: 80% animist, about 20% Christian and under 1 % Hindu and Muslim

Language: English official; wide variety of indigenous languages

Literacy: 15-20%

Labor force: 304,000 wage-earners; 269,000 Africans, 32,000 non-Africans; 18% mining, 10% agriculture, 10% domestic service, 15% construction, 8% commerce, 11% manufacturing, 27% miscellaneous services

Organized labor: a majority of industrial wage-earners are unionized

##### GOVERNMENT (U)

Capital: Lusaka

Regional breakdown: 8 provinces

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

August 1966

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Type: independent republic since Oct. 1964; formerly a British protectorate  
Organization: modified presidential system; unicameral legislature; judicial system, a mixture of western and tribal law  
Government leader: President Kenneth Kaunda  
Suffrage: universal adult  
Elections: last election (Jan. 1964)  
Political parties and leaders: United National Independence Party (UNIP), Kenneth Kaunda; African National Congress (ANC), Harry Nkumbula; National Progress Party (NPP), John Roberts  
Voting strength (1964 election): UNIP had 69% of vote, but 24 of its candidates were unopposed; strength probably would have been about 80% if these seats had been contested  
Communists: no Communist party, but sympathizers of socialism in upper levels of government, UNIP, and labor unions

#### ECONOMY (U)

GDP: \$671 million (1964), about \$190 per capita  
Agriculture: corn, tobacco, cotton, peanuts, cattle; net importer of every major agricultural product except corn  
Major industries: copper mining and processing  
Electric power: 966 mw. capacity (1964) including 705 mw. Kariba power station, jointly owned with Rhodesia; 2.9 billion kw.-hr. consumed (1965)  
Exports: \$470 million (1964); copper, zinc, tobacco, lead, cobalt  
Imports: \$219 million (1964); consumer goods, machinery, transport equipment, foodstuffs, fuels  
Trade: single tariff schedule; major partners—U.K., Rhodesia, South Africa, Japan, Western Europe  
Aid: U.K. provided \$21 million (1964) and has promised additional long-term development loans; IBRD loans \$67 million (1960-65); \$1.9 million from U.S. (FY 1964 and 1965)  
Exchange rate: 1 Zambia pound = US\$2.80 (official)  
Fiscal year: 1 July-30 June

#### COMMUNICATIONS (Confidential)

Railroads: about 840 mi., all narrow gage (3'6"); 8 mi. double tracked; 640 mi. are owned jointly with Rhodesia Railways; 200 mi. privately owned  
Highways: 21,217 mi.; 817 mi. paved, 3,124 mi. crushed stone, gravel, or stabilized soil, 17,276 mi. improved and unimproved earth  
Inland waterways: 1,409 mi. on Zambezi River, Luapula River, Lake Kariba, Lake Bangwulu; principal port on Lake Tanganyika is Mpulungu

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM


Zambia — 7

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

August 1966

Civil air: no major transport aircraft; Zambia Airways operates 2 major transports registered in Rhodesia  
Airfields: 83 total, 64 usable; 4 with permanent surface runways; 19 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.  
Telecommunications: all services being expanded and modernized; presently adequate; high capacity wire and radio relay links connect centers of Kitwe in northern mining region and Lusaka along axial north-south route; 1 TV and 5 AM stations; 31,000 telephones

25X6



**National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material**

The following sections of the NIS are relevant:

NIS Area 57 (Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi)

- Sec 20 Introduction—Military
  - Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions
  - Sec 23 Weather and Climate
  - Sec 24 Topography
  - Sec 25 Urban Areas
  - Sec 30 Introduction—Transportation & Telecommunications
  - Sec 31 Railway
  - Sec 32 Highway
  - Sec 38 Telecommunications
  - Sec 45 Health and Sanitation
  - Sec 62 Fuels and Power
  - Sec 63 Minerals and Metals
  - Sec 91-94 Map and Chart Appraisal
- Gazetteer

25X1B




**Map**

The best available general reference map is: Surveyor-General's Department; *The Republic of Zambia*; 1:2,000,000; 1964

8 — Zambia

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM



52583 1-66